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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a pond, which is part of a larger wetland and located adjacent to a navigable water, is within the Clean Water Act's
jurisdiction where a significant nexus exists through intermittent surface connection and an underground aquifer and because pond waters
significantly affect the physical, biological, and chemical integrity of
the navigable river).
In December 2001, Northern California River Watch ("River
Watch") filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California alleging that the City of Healdsburg
("Healdsburg") violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
sewage from its waste treatment plant into waters covered by the Act
without first obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Healdsburg appealed the district court's finding that the Pond is subject to the CWA and claimed that the Pond is
exempt because the CWA excludes waste treatments systems and active
excavation operations. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision.
In 1967, Basalt Rock Company ("Company") began excavating gravel and sand from land adjacent to the Russian River. After the Company completed its operation, the excavation pit filled up with water
from the underlying aquifer and formed Basalt Pond ("Pond"). The
Pond contains 58 acres of surface water and wetlands and a levee separated it from the Russian River ("River"), a navigable water. Water
passes from the Pond to the River through an underground aquifer
and by seeping through the separating levee. Healdsburg discharged
enough effluent annually to nearly fill the Pond, which would overflow
if the Pond did not drain into the aquifer, and ultimately into the River.
First, the court considered whether the Pond was subject to the
CWA because it is a wetland that is adjacent to a water of the United
States. Wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are regulable waters of
the United States. The Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") regulations define wetlands as an area that is "inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater." The regulations further specify that "adjacent
wetlands" are those that are "separated from waters of the United
States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes
and the like." There was no dispute as to whether the Russian River is
navigable and therefore a water of the United States. Both parties
agreed that the Pond and the River overlie the same aquifer and that
the land separating the two is saturated below the water table. Further,
the Pond's receding shoreline turned much of the area that was originally the Pond into wetland. Thus, the court determined that the
Pond and surrounding area was within the CWA's jurisdiction and con-
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stituted "waters of the United States" because it is an "adjacent wetland" within the Corps' regulatory definition.
Although the court had already found that the Pond was within the
CWA's jurisdiction, the court next looked at whether the Pond qualified as a water of the United States based on whether a "significant
nexus" existed between the Pond and River. A significant nexus exists
if "the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters." The court found that there was a
significant nexus because (1) a physical connection existed through
both a hydrologic and a surface connection between the River and
Pond, (2) an ecological connection existed because both the River and
Pond support similar populations of fish, mammals, and birds, and (3)
Healdsburg's discharge of sewage directly resulted in higher concentrations of chloride in the River downstream from the Pond, and thereby affected the chemical integrity of the River. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the Pond's effects on the River
are "not speculative or insubstantial" and have a significant impact on
the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the River.
The court rejected Healdsburg's argument that the Pond fell within the CWA's exception for waste treatment systems and for ongoing
excavation operations. The waste treatment exception is intended to
exempt "either water systems that do not discharge into waters of the
United States or waters that are incorporated in an NPDES permit as
part of a treatment system." Because the Pond is neither incorporated
in an NPDES permit nor a closed system treatment pond, it did not fall
under this exemption. The excavation operation exception applies
only to bodies of water that are currently under excavation. The court
determined that using the pond to discharge wastewater from the
treatment plant and to deposit mining waste from other locations did
not constitute an ongoing excavation operation. Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the excavation operation
exception did not apply because the Company abandoned its excavation activities in 1984 and there was no "ongoing excavation operation."
In conclusion, the court held that the Pond was a water of the
United States regulated by the CWA. Therefore, Healdsburg violated
the CWA by discharging wastewater into the Pond.
James Shine
United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the evidence sufficiently supported the determination that Teton
Creek constituted a water of the United States, that Moses caused the
unauthorized discharge of pollutants into the Creek, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied consecutive motions for a new trial).

